Each Afghan valley has its own politics, with its own peculiar blend of warlords, tribal leaders, foreign fanatics, Afghan government personnel, and NATO troops. Allegiances can shift quickly, and often in ways known only to Afghans.
The elites in an Afghan province cannot be managed effectively from Washington, nor even from Kabul in most cases. Winning the tribes over is best left to Afghan provincial governors and Afghan and American battalion commanders, who can keep abreast of the shifting local dynamics and customize military and political actions accordingly.
In fact, Gen. Stanley McChrystal's review team has studied the opportunities for further cooperation with warlords and tribal leaders and deemed them an inadequate substitute for additional American combat troops. The facts on the ground tend to support that judgment. According to American officers in Afghanistan today, tribal elders will gladly take US money and assure the US that they are eradicating insurgents, but will not really take up arms against the insurgents, or even share where improvised explosive devices are located, unless the counterinsurgents can protect them and their families from reprisals.
Only by sending tens of thousands of additional American troops and partnering them with Afghan forces can the US provide the security the fence sitters crave.
Blogging from Northern Virginia!
Monday, November 16, 2009
Obama's Afghanistan plan: the warlord factor
Here is an article from the Christian Science Monitor about Afghanistan and what the proposed surge of troops may look like in the provinces: Obama's Afghanistan plan: the warlord factor
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2 comments:
There's also the problem that McCrystal and the US ambassador don't see eye to eye on the stratgy to be used in Afghanistan.
Karsai's support is also waning, although he needs our support. A lack of support is going to push him towards the more unsavory elements in Afghanistan. His government might be riddled with corruption, but it's better than the Taliban.
Yeah, I read about the ambassador's lack of confidence in Karsai and his government. I read yesterday that Karsai has introduced the third attempt at a national corruption task force. Don't hold your breath.
Corruption in the government provides ammunition for the Taliban in painting the government as not representative of the Afghani principles, which the Taliban themselves represent. If tribal folks aren't willing to cooperate with the Karsai government, then we won't win Counterinsurgency.
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